The attacks happened simultaneously across multiple protocols: Compound, dYdX, Uniswap. And we find some interesting facts:
· Return on Capital (17% for the first and 54% for the second) is pretty high considering only within several seconds.
· In the second attack, the attack’s profit takes 88% of the total loss compared to the first one’s 50%.
· bZx is the only one suffering from these two attacks. The first attack left a bankruptcy position and the second one left an undercollateralized loan.
The bZx exploits over the long weekend in the US were the first major attacks in decentralized finance.
We will be working towards the three medianized oracle price feed model initially proposed in our whitepaper. This will be done in three steps.
In Phase 0 we will use Chainlink to provide reference prices. In Phase 1 we will incorporate both Chainlink and Band protocol oracles. The final form of the oracle system will be to include price information from Chainlink, Band, and Uniswap v2.0. The prices will be medianized, and that median price will be used as the reference rate.
Thought I would share my sim swapping story and how I lost everything, hopefully it’s helpful, entertaining or of some value to people. Mid day…
The last month of 2019 has started with bad news for two relatively small projects in the Cryptoverse: a crypto exchange, CryptoBridge, ranked 187, is shutting down, while a coin, ranked 235th, Vertcoin (VTC), experienced another 51% attack.
In this paper, bribing attacks and similar techniques, which we refer to as incentive attacks, are systematically analyzed and categorized. We show that the problem space is not fully explored and present several new and improved incentive attacks.
TL;DR: Optimistic rollup relies on absolute censorship-resistance of L1 for its security. While L1 provides some decent economic incentives against mass censorship, it is easy to construct a scenario in which censorship of a particular single transaction is strongly rewarded, while non-censoring behavior is strongly penalized for a prolonged period of time. Optimistic Rollup’s 1 honest observer assumption is in reality 51% altruistic (not just honest!) L1 miners assumption.